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Abstract
In this paper I formulate a continuous time and continuous space version of Harris
and Vickers (1987) Racing Under Uncertainty with potentially asymmetric players. To
prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibria, I use a boundary value problem
formulation which is novel to the dynamic competition literature. In some cases, I
obtain closed-form solutions of the equilibria in which equilibrium strategies exhibit
the discouragement e⁄ect similar to the one in the original paper.
￿I wish to thank Daron Acemoglu for his advice. Also thanks to Axel Anderson, David Cesarini, Jean-
Paul L￿ Huillier, Giuseppe Moscarini, Yuliy Sannikov, Lones Smith, Ivan Werning and participants at the
MIT Macro Lunch for helpful comments.
11 Introduction
A race is a contest between two or more competitors who exert e⁄ort to win a prize. Sport
contests, such as bicycle races, golf tournaments and basketball championships, are the most
popular forms of races. Races studied in economic theory include patent races and contests
for job promotion. Despite its importance, the theoretical literature on dynamic competition
has been relatively sparse. Harris and Vickers (1987) is a pioneering paper with a model
in discrete state-space. In their model, they prove that at least one equilibrium exists and
characterize some of its properties. However, they only prove the uniqueness of the symmetric
equilibria and they do not allow for discounting. This paper introduces a continuous time,
continuous state-space model based on Harris and Vickers (1987)￿ s tug-of-war to address
the question of the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. The existence and uniqueness
theorems apply for some cases with asymmetric players and discounting.
In this model, two players compete for a ￿nal reward. The reward is won by the ￿rst
player who achieves a given distance over his rival. At any moment when the race is going
on, each player puts in e⁄ort which in￿ uences the distance between him and his rival: a
Brownian motion with a drift that depends on the e⁄orts of the players. The cost of e⁄ort
functions are strictly convex. I consider the set of Markovian Perfect Equilibria (MPEs)
in which equilibrium strategies of the players are conditioned only on the current distance
between them. I prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium MPE strategies under
some weak conditions on the cost functions and ￿nal rewards. In some special cases, the
continuous time framework delivers a closed-form solution of MPEs which facilitates the
characterization of equilibrium strategies1.
The equilibrium strategies share basic properties with the equilibrium strategies in the
discrete state space model in Harris and Vickers (1987). As in the latter, the Markov Perfect
Equilibrium (MPE) strategies exhibit a discouragement e⁄ect: The players exert high e⁄ort
only when they are close to each other. When a player is left further behind by his rival,
he reduces his e⁄ort given his slim chance of winning. The rival who gets further ahead
therefore faces less competition and can safely reduce his e⁄ort. A larger distance between
the two players thus discourages both players. Harris and Vickers (1987) however show the
discouragement e⁄ect only for the case in which two players have the same cost function and
they do not discount the future. In contrast, I use the theory of boundary value problems
for systems of second-order di⁄erential equations developed in Hartman (1964); this theory
allows me to consider the model an show the discouragement e⁄ect in full generality with
potentially asymmetric players and with discounting.
Moscarini and Smith (2007) is the ￿rst paper to address the optimal design of the race
in a similar continuous time, continuous state-space model. Moscarini and Smith take a dif-
ferent approach to solving the model, relying on the symmetry of Markov Perfect Equilibria.
Besides restricting their attention to symmetric equilibria, the authors consider only the case
of no discounting.
Budd, Harris, and Vickers (1993) also solve a similar model using boundary value rep-
resentations. Their method only applies when the discount rate r goes to in￿nity. Another
1In the case with identical players, Moscarini and Smith (2007) ￿nd a closed-form identical to mine up
to an a¢ ne transformation. Their method relies on symmetric equilibria. My method covers asymmetric
equilibria also.
2continuous time continuous state-space version of the Harris and Vickers model is developed
in Horner (1999). He restricts the action space to be ￿nite, allowing for only two levels of
e⁄ort. Hence, the MPE strategies are such that players switch their actions only infrequently
based on some threshold rule.
In the next section, I present the model. In Section 3, I prove the existence and uniqueness
of MPEs with general cost functions under some weak restrictions, both with and without
discounting. In Section 4, I study the properties of equilibrium strategies including the dis-
couragement e⁄ect. I also illustrate these properties for the case of quadratic cost functions.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Two players, A and B, engage in a contest for a ￿nal reward in continuous time. At each
moment, each player chooses an e⁄ort, xA for player A which costs him cA (xA) and xB for
player B which costs him cB (xB). In Harris and Vickers (1987), A and B are two research
￿rms competing for an exclusive patent. The e⁄ort can then be interpreted as money spent
on laboratories, equipment, researchers, etc. The players discount future costs and rewards
at (potentially di⁄erent) rates ri ￿ 0.
Let z 2 R denote the relative distance between the two players. The race starts at z = 0,
and a player wins the race if he attains a certain lead over the other player: Player A wins
the race with reward PA when he reaches his lead over B, z = KA > 0, and B wins the race
with reward PB when he reaches his lead (￿KB) over A, i.e., z = KB < 0. Therefore, z is
also the only payo⁄ relevant state of the race.2
The uncertainty is incorporated in the temporal evolution of the state zt :
dzt = (xAt ￿ xBt)dt + ￿dWt; (1)
where Wt is a standard Brownian motion and W0 = 0.
In order to ensure that in each moment the e⁄ort choice of each player is a well-de￿ned
maximization problem with a unique solution, I impose the following standard assumption
on the cost function of each player
Assumption 1 The cost functions ci (x) are twice continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly in-
creasing and strictly convex: c0
i (x) > 0 and c00
i (x) > 0 8x > 0 and i 2 fA;Bg. Moreover the
players do not bear any cost if they do not exert e⁄ort, ci (0) = 0 and the Inada conditions
2In this model, the only payo⁄relevant state is the distance between the two players because the outcome
of the race only depends on the distance. While this model might be a suitable description of some type
of races such a race for job promotion or tie-breaks in tennis, it is not a good model for patent races in
which a player wins if he achieves a certain discovery, not his progress relative to the other player. In Cao
(2009), I develop a model for this situation. The payo⁄ relevant state is a vector of two numbers, distance
of each player to a ￿nish line. However, that model is less tractable, and I can only solve it numerically.
The equilibrium strategies in this race exhibits similar properties to the equilibrium strategies in this paper.
Moreover, in discrete state spaces, Harris and Vickers (1987) conjecture and verify numerically that the
tug-of-war race is a close approximation of the two dimension race. Similar conjecture holds for continuous
state-space.
3at 0 and 1 are satis￿ed:
c
0
i (0) = 0 and lim
x￿!+1c
0
i (x) = +1:
In addition, in order for the stochastic di⁄erential equation (1) describing the evolution of
the state variable z to have a solution, the e⁄ort choices xi;t must be bounded. I will impose
an explicit bound on the e⁄ort choice of each player: 0 ￿ xi;t ￿ x. The following assumption










This assumption means that the marginal cost increases fast enough at high levels of
e⁄ort so that the players never want to exert too much e⁄ort. It will be shown later in the



























= PA + PB: (2)
Such an M exists due to Assumption 2.3 This assumption is satis￿ed if c00
i (x) are bounded
below from 0 at in￿nity; i.e., there exists an ￿ and an x￿ > 0 such that c00
i (x) > ￿ 8x > x￿:
Geometric cost functions ci (x) = cixki with ki ￿ 2 satisfy this assumption, in particular
quadratic cost functions satisfy this assumption since they have constant second derivatives.
If this assumption is not satis￿ed, for example, in the extreme, when they are both linear,
players will exert high e⁄ort and might reach any upper bound on the e⁄orts. I rule out this
situation to avoid imposing any ad-hoc bound on e⁄ort of the players. Horner (1999) is an
example of races in which ci (:) are linear. In equilibrium, the players only choose between
two levels of e⁄ort which can be interpreted as the bounds that he imposes on the e⁄orts of
the players given the linearity of the cost functions. The equilibrium strategies are such that
players switch their actions only infrequently based on some threshold rule. This structure
of equilibria is thus very di⁄erent from equilibria in my model.
Under the restrictions on the cost functions and the e⁄ort choice of the players, the
expected payo⁄ functions of each player i following a optimal strategy Xi = fxitg
1
t=0 given
his rival￿ s strategy X￿i = fx￿itg
1
t=0 is well-de￿ned:














where ￿ is the ￿nish time of the race, i.e., the ￿rst time where either zt reaches KA; player
A wins the race, or zt reaches KB, player B wins the race. The indicator function indicates
who wins the race. Notice that ￿ is a random variable depending on the uncertain evolution
3Harris and Vickers (1987, p7) also assumes this. However, they do not show conditions under which the
bound is not binding.
4of the race; or more precisely, it is a stopping time. The race starts at z0 2 (KB;KA). There
are two components of the payo⁄functions. The ￿rst part is the discounted reward e￿r￿Pi if
player i wins the race, and the second part is the discounted cost of e⁄ort, e￿rt ci (xit), that
player i continuously makes during the race. Each player chooses a strategy maximizing his
expected payo⁄ given his rival￿ s strategy.
The problem now is to ￿nd the equilibrium strategy functions, (XA;XB) such that each
player maximizes his expected payo⁄ given his rival￿ s strategy. It is well-known that the
best response to a Markov strategy is a Markov strategy thus any MPE is a subgame perfect
equilibrium. An analogy for continuous time games is that, if strategy xBt is Markovian, i.e.
function of zt only, then xAt can be chosen from the class of Markovian strategies, and vice
versa; therefore, I can restrict myself to cases where both strategies are Markovian.
I further restrict myself to the set of equilibria with twice di⁄erentiable value functions
in order to write the second derivatives. We can then obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman














At each moment, the e⁄ort choice of each player involves the trade-o⁄ between the current
convex cost of e⁄ort, ￿ci (x) with higher chance of winning, taken the other player￿ s strategy
as given,(x ￿ x￿i (zt))J0
i (zt) . Each player also discounts the future payo⁄,￿rJi (zt); and
takes into account the uncertainty evolution of the state z; ￿2
2 J00
i (zt). The ￿rst order condi-
tions from (4) determine the e⁄ort levels of players as functions of the derivatives of their
value functions:

















Finally, the boundary conditions for JA and JB are
Ji (Ki) = Pi;J￿i (Ki) = 0: (7)
These boundary conditions are intuitive: when A is KA ahead of B; he wins the reward
PA, B receives nothing and when B is ￿KB ahead of A; he wins the reward PB, A receives
nothing:
De￿nition 1 A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) is a pair of equilibrium payo⁄ functions
(JA (z);JB (z)) satisfying the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (4) and the boundary con-
ditions (7) and a pair of equilibrium strategies (xA (z);xB (z)) given by (5).
The task of ￿nding MPE strategies becomes solving a second-order boundary value
problem on (JA (z);JB (z)). We ￿rst solve the e⁄ort choice given the incentive J0
i (z) as
in (5).Then, by plugging the e⁄ort choice into (4), we can re-write the Hamilton-Jacobi-



































A) ￿ fB (￿J0
B))J0
A ￿ cA (fA (J0
A))
(fA (J0
A) ￿ fB (￿J0
B))J0




Rewriting the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations as a boundary value problem allows me to
use the theory of boundary value for systems of second order di⁄erential equation developed
in Hartman (1964). Using this system, some preliminary properties of the payo⁄ functions
can be shown. First, the payo⁄ functions are strictly positive except at the two boundaries.
This is because, whenever the race is not yet concluded, a player can choose to stay in the
race and to exert no e⁄ort, but he still has a positive probability of winning due to the
uncertain evolution of the state z. Second, the closer a player is to his goal, the higher his
expected payo⁄ is because he has more chance of winning. Hence, the slope of the payo⁄
function, which is the incentive determining the e⁄ort level of each player, is strictly positive
in absolute value. So (6) implies that each player will exert a strictly positive e⁄ort at any
moment of the race, that is, xi (z) > 0 8z and i 2 fA;Bg.
Lemma 1 A solution of the payo⁄ functions (JA;JB) to the system (8) satis￿es
1. Strict positivity of the payo⁄ functions: JA (z);JB (z) > 0 for all z 2 (KB;KA):
Given the option to exert no e⁄ort, and the Brownian evolution of the distance between
the two players, each player has a strictly positive probability of winning the race without
incurring any cost of e⁄ort; their payo⁄ functions are thus strictly positive whenever
the race is not yet concluded.
2. Strict positivity of incentives: J0
A (z) > 0 and J0
B (z) < 0 for all z 2 (KB;KA): As
each player moves closer to his goal, he has a higher probability of winning the race,
therefore, his payo⁄ is higher. Since the incentives are strictly positive, the players
always exert a strictly positive level of e⁄ort.
Proof. In the Appendix, using the Gronwall￿ s Inequality.
3 Existence and Uniqueness of Markov Perfect Equi-
librium
Before analyzing the equilibrium strategies and outcomes of the race, it is important to
prove the existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria and their uniqueness, or equivalently the
existence and uniqueness of the solution to the boundary value problem (8). The steps of
the existence and uniqueness proof are in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 A Markov equilibrium exists.
Proof. In the Appendix. It is enough to show that the boundary value problem (8) has at
least one solution
As in other economic models, it is more di¢ cult to ensure the uniqueness of equilibria.
As a result, an extra condition, in addition to Assumption 2 on the cost of e⁄ort functions,
is required to ensure the uniqueness of the MPE.
6Theorem 2 Suppose that c00
i (x) are bounded below, i.e., there exists an ￿ such that
c
00
i (x) > ￿ 8x:


















where M is determined in (2).
Proof. In the Appendix.
Notice that the left hand side of (10) is strictly increasing in M and the (2) implies
that M is increasing in max(PA;PB), so the solution is unique if max(PA;PB) is relatively
small, the discount factor is relatively high or the degree of uncertainty, ￿, is relatively large.
Finally, as in Harris and Vickers (1987), the race is more likely to admit a unique equilibrium
if the cost function is su¢ ciently convex, i.e., ￿ is su¢ ciently large.
4 The Discouragement E⁄ect
The previous section establishes the general existence and uniqueness of the MPE. In this
section, I investigate some properties of the MPE strategies. A striking property is that
higher distance between the leader and the follower discourages both from exerting e⁄ort,
which is often mentioned as the discouragement e⁄ect. This e⁄ect leads to an ambiguous
e⁄ect of incentives, such as the e⁄ect of higher ￿nal reward to the winner of the race on the
total expected e⁄ort of the players. Moscarini and Smith (2007) show that a higher ￿nal
reward does not necessarily increase the total expected e⁄ort of the players. In Cao (2009), I
show that also due to this discouragement e⁄ect, handicapping the advantaged player might
counter-intuitively reduce the expected completion time of the race.
In Subsection 4.1, I show the discouragement e⁄ect for general cost functions. I illustrate
this e⁄ect with a special case of quadratic cost functions in Subsection 4.2 where I can ￿nd a
closed form solution. The factors that a⁄ect the intensity of this e⁄ect are the ￿nal rewards,
the amount of uncertainty, the level of the cost of e⁄ort to the two players.
4.1 General cost functions
I ￿nd two properties of the MPE strategies which are similar to the discrete time MPE
strategies in Harris and Vickers (1987). First, the leader in the race puts in higher e⁄orts
than the follower does. Second, e⁄orts of both players decrease as the gap between them
increases. Other R&D competition models share the second property of MPE strategies.
For instance, Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001) and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008),
both ￿nd that e⁄ort is highest when ￿rms are technologically close to each other. The ￿rst
property, however, does not hold in all models. For instance, the models of Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2008) and Reinganum (1983) have the opposite property. In their model, there is an
Arrow￿ s replacement e⁄ect, i.e., the leading ￿rm receives ￿ ow pro￿ts before successful new
7innovations, so it has relatively weaker incentive than the follower to stochastically shorten
the random time to the next innovation. In contrast, in my model, players only receive
reward at the end; the Arrow￿ s replacement e⁄ect is thus not present.
To formalize the discouragement e⁄ect, I de￿ne the pivot of the game, z￿, as where the
two players exert the same e⁄ort level, i.e. xA (z￿) = xB (z￿). If there does not exist such a z￿
then either, xA (z) > xB (z) for all z 2 [KB;KA], we de￿ne z￿ = KB, or xA (z) < xB (z) for
all z 2 [KB;KA], we de￿ne z￿ = KA. So z￿ always exists. In a symmetric equilibrium, as in
Moscarini and Smith (2007), z￿ = 0: Harris and Vickers (1987) only prove the discouragement
e⁄ect for the case in which cA ￿ cB. In such a case, z￿ can be de￿ned equivalently as
z￿ = argmin
z2[KB;KA]
(JA (z) + JB (z)):
The following lemma shows that z￿ is unique.
Lemma 2 xA (z) > xB (z) for all z 2 (z￿;KA] and xA (z) < xB (z) for all z 2 [KB;z￿).
Proof. Appendix
Given this pivot z￿, we can say that, at a moment t, A is the leader of the race if he is
relatively closer to his goal than B (the follower) is, that is, zt > z￿ and vice versa when
zt < z￿. Given the potential asymmetries between the two players, z￿ does not necessarily
correspond to the point
KA+KB
2 where the two players are at equal absolute distances from
their goal, except for symmetric equilibria.
Lemma 2 then means that the leader always exerts higher e⁄ort than the follower does.
Also using the pivot, we can state the discouragement e⁄ect in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that z > z￿;that is, player A is the leader and player B is the
follower, then
1. The discouragement e⁄ect on the follower: The follower, player B, reduces his
e⁄ort as he gets further behind. That is, xB (z) is strictly decreasing in z.
2. The discouragement e⁄ect on the leader: Suppose rA = 0, once the leader,
player A, starts slowing down at z, he will continue to do so at any e z > z. That is if
x0
A (z) ￿ 0 then x0
A (e z) < 0 for all e z > z:4
Proof. Appendix
Let us take a closer look at the interaction between the players￿impatience and strategic
motives in their e⁄ort choice. When a player is behind, the discouragement e⁄ect and
discounting both serve to lower e⁄ort provision (part 1 of Proposition 1). However, when a
player is su¢ ciently ahead, the strategic motivation reduces his incentive to provide greater
e⁄ort, whereas discounting operates in the opposite direction. Indeed, numerical analysis
shows that when the leader￿ s discount rate is su¢ ciently high, the impatience is strong
enough to cancel the slowing down interval in which the leader reduces his e⁄ort after getting
further ahead from the follower. Consequently, part 2 of Proposition 1 requires the additional
assumption that rA = 0.
4We can also show that, if z￿ is strictly interior, intially player A will increase his e⁄ort, that is, x0
A (z) > 0
for z close to z￿.
84.2 Example: Quadratic cost functions
Consider the case of quadratic cost and no discounting. I can solve the game in closed form.
Moscarini and Smith (2007) obtain a closed-form identical to the one presented here for
symmetric equilibria, up to an a¢ ine transformation. Their method relies on the symmetry
of equilibria. My method to derived closed-form solutions covers asymmetric equilibria also.5
I also establish the equivalence between lower cost of e⁄ort, lower uncertainty and higher
￿nal reward.
Let the cost of e⁄ort functions be quadratic ci (x) = x2
2￿i. The higher ￿i is, the less e⁄ort
costs to player i.












where (e xA (e z);e xB (e z)) is a Markov equilibrium of the game with parameters e ￿A = e ￿B = e ￿ = 1




This lemma says that, holding everything else constant, a player would be indi⁄erent
between seeing its cost decreases from x2
￿ to x2
￿0 and seeing the ￿nal reward augmented by ￿0
￿ .
Moreover, both players would be indi⁄erent seeing the degree of uncertainty decreases from
￿ to ￿0 and seeing their ￿nal rewards augmented by ￿
￿0.
The pair of the strategy functions is a solution to a vector-valued ￿rst-order boundary
problem. The closed-form solution is derived in the Appendix in which show that we can
implicitly solve for the e⁄ort ratio of the e⁄ort choices of the two players, g =
xA(z)
xB(z), as a





+ 2ln(g) = C1z + C2 (11)
Since f (g) = g ￿ 1
g + 2ln(g) is strictly increasing over the interval (0;+1) and
lim
g￿!0f (g) = ￿1, lim
g￿!1f (g) = +1;
for each z there exists a unique g (z) satis￿es (11):We have C1 greater than 0, thus g (z)
is increasing in z, i.e., a player exerts relatively higher e⁄ort than his rival does when the
former is closer to his goal. The "pivot" of the race then corresponds to z￿ where g (z￿) = 1.
It follow immediately from the fact that g (z) is strictly increasing that the leader always
exert higher e⁄ort than the followers does. The discouragement e⁄ects in Proposition 1,








Let z > z￿. For the follower, given g (z) is increasing in z and xB is strictly increasing in g
if g > 1
2, xB is strictly decreasing. For the leader, xA starts decreasing his e⁄ort at z￿￿ such




1+k ;k > 0; however the ￿nal
expressions are not as simple as the ones for quadratic cost functions.
9that g (z￿￿)= 2. So depending on whether g (KA) > 2, i.e. on Pi;￿i,￿ from expression (27)
in the Appendix, the leader will start slowing down before the end of the race.
The higher the ￿nal reward, the stronger the discouragement e⁄ect. When PA and PB
are large, the two players will both exert high e⁄ort only when they are close to each other,
however when one player gets further ahead of his rival, he wants to reduce his e⁄ort because
the cost of e⁄ort is too high to him. He can safely reduce his e⁄ort since the continuous time,
continuous state-space and perfect information features of the race allow him to commit to
engage in a war phase with high e⁄ort when his rival gets closer to him. Given this strategy,
his rival also reduces e⁄ort because of the smaller chance to win the race. As both PA, PB
go to in￿nity, both players only exert in￿nitely high e⁄ort over a in￿nitely small distance to
each other. As one of them takes the lead, the other reduces his e⁄ort to almost 0, and the
leader exerts an in￿nitesimal e⁄ort level as well.
Moreover, the equivalence result above shows that lower cost of e⁄ort delivers the same
equilibrium strategies as if the cost of e⁄ort remains unchanged but the ￿nal rewards are
higher. Thus, the lower the cost of e⁄ort to the players, the stronger the discouragement
e⁄ect. Lower cost of e⁄ort allows the players to sustain their strategy more cheaply.
Finally, also by the equivalence result, a lower uncertainty on the evolution of the state of
the race, i.e. lower ￿, corresponds to higher PA and PB, and thus a stronger discouragement
e⁄ect. Indeed, the equivalent strategies are the same as in the case of unit uncertainty ￿ = 1
and the ￿nal rewards are respectively e PA =
PA
￿2 and e PB =
PB
￿2 : In the limiting case when,
there is no uncertainty, i.e., ￿ = 0, the disadvantaged player knows that the advantaged
player will rationally outdo any e⁄ort he makes. This credible threat discourages the weaker
player from making any e⁄ort. Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Harris and Vickers (1985) stress
the same point.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a simple continuous time model of racing under uncertainty. I prove
the existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria and, in some cases, also their uniqueness. The
equilibria have similar properties to those in the original discrete time model. In addition, for
some special cases, I can derive the closed-form of these MPE strategies, which facilitates the
study of the comparative statics. In Cao (2009), I use this closed-form solution to show that
handicapping the advantaged player in a race might be useful. A future research direction
is to develop a model with more realistic features of certain races, for example, allowing for
more general cost functions, discounting, and for a ￿nish line instead of distance between
players. Even though these models do not have closed-form MPEs, in Cao (2009) I show
that it is still possible to numerically compute the equilibria, and examine their properties.
Interestingly, the properties of the MPEs in these models are consistent with the results from
the less general model.
10Appendix
Derivation of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. For example, for ￿rm A at time
t; assume that it optimizes from t + ￿t forward and solves















￿￿tcA (x) + e
￿rA￿t (JA (zt) + ￿JA (zt)) + o(￿t)
￿
(13)
The ￿rst part of the last expression is the ￿ ow of the cost of R&D e⁄ort during a time interval
of length ￿t. The second part is the discounted continuation value after this time interval.
The continuation value is discounted by the factor e￿rA￿t = 1 ￿ rA￿t + o(￿t);where, from
now on, o(￿t) denotes second-order terms. This continuation value depends on the evolution
of zt to zt+￿t. By Ito￿ s Lemma, we have:








A (zt)￿t + o(￿t)
= J
0








A (zt)￿t + o(￿t):
Taking the expectations of both sides, and using the normal independent increments property
of the Brownian noise, we have Et [J0
A (zt)￿￿Wt] = 0. Thus
Et [￿JA (zt)] = J
0






A (zt)￿t + o(￿t):
Now, substitute these results into (13) and subtract JA (zt) from both sides. Dividing all
terms by ￿t, and taking the limit as ￿t ￿! 0, we obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation (4) for the value function of ￿rm A: We obtain similarly the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation (4) for the value function of ￿rm B:
To prove Lemma 1, we will make use of the Gronwall￿ s Inequality6 in (Hartman 1964,
pg. 24).
Proof of Lema 1. 1) Let z￿ be a minimum of JA (z) over the interval [KB;KA] (since JA (:)
is continuous, that minimum exists). If z￿ is an interior point then we have J0
A (z￿) = 0. From
6Grownwall￿ s Inequality, Hartman (1964) II-1.1 Let u(t) and v (t) be non-negative, continuous
functions on [a;b]; C ￿ 0 a constant; and
v (t) ￿ C +
Z t
a
v (s)u(s)ds for a ￿ t ￿ b:
Then





for a ￿ t ￿ b;
in particular, if C = 0; then v ￿ 0:
11(4) we have J00
A (z￿) = 2 rAJA (z￿): In addition since z￿ is a minimum, we have J00
A (z￿) ￿ 0
so JA (z￿) ￿ 0. Furthermore, at the two boundaries, JA ￿ 0 therefore JA (z) ￿ 0 for all z 2
[KB;KA].
Now if there exists an interior point z￿ such that JA (z￿) = 0, let z￿￿ be a maximum of
JA (:) over [KB;z￿]; then J0
A (z￿) = 0 and J00
A (z￿￿) = 2rAJA (z￿￿). Since z￿￿ is a maximum
and J00
A (z￿￿) ￿ 0, we have JA (z￿￿) ￿ 0, thus JA (z) = 0 for all z 2 [KB;z￿]. And from the






We can show that this yields a contradiction because JA would be identically 0 over [z￿;KA].





￿2 jrAJA (z) + cA (fA (J
0
A (z))) ￿ (fA (J
0





￿2 jJA (z)j + 3xjJ
0
A (z)j; (14)
where the inequalities is obtained from the three inequalities
0 ￿ xB (z) ￿ x
0 ￿ fA (J
0
A (z)) ￿ x













Apply the Gronwall￿ s inequality for jJA (z)j
2 + jJ0
A (z)j
2 ; we have JA (z) = J0
A (z) = 0 8z 2
[z￿;KA]. This yields a contradiction with the fact that JA (KA) = PA > 0.
So we have JA (z) > 0 for all z 2 (KB;KA). The proof for JB (z) is analogous.














If there exists some z1 2 (KB;KA) such that J0
A (z1) < 0; then, by the intermediate value
theorem, there exists an interior point z￿ between z0 and z1 such that J0
A (z￿) = 0. Hence,




￿) = 2rAJA (z
￿) > 0:
Consider the interval [KB;z￿] ,at z = KB, JA (KB) = 0:The extreme KB cannot be a
maximum of JA over this interval. And in a neighborhood z = z￿ ￿ " of z￿,














so this extreme z￿ cannot be a maximum over the interval, either. Thus, JA has an interior
maximum in the interval. Denote this maximum z￿￿. We have J0
A (z￿￿) = 0. This yields a
12contradiction because it implies J00
A (z￿￿) > 0; or z￿￿ is a local minimum.
We have established that J0
A (z) > 0 8z 2 (KB;KA). The argument for J0
B (z) < 0 8z 2
(KB;KA) is analogous.
The proof for the case rA = 0 is easier. For example, if there exists z￿ 2 [KB;KA] such that
J0
A (z￿) = 0, then, as derived in (14)
jJ
00
A (z)j ￿ 3xjJ
0
A (z)j:
Again, by applying the Gronwall￿ s inequality, we have J0
A (z) = 0 8z 2 [KB;KA]: But we
know that,
JA (KB) = 0 < PA = JA (KA)
and hence we have a contradiction. It follows that J0
A (z) > 0 8z 2 [KB;KA]. The argument
for J0
B (z) < 0 8z 2 (KB;KA) is analogous.
Steps of the proof of Theorem 1. The steps of the existence proof are the following. I
will show that there exist constants P;M and a globally bounded vector-valued function g
satisfying
1)8jJij ￿ P;jJ0






























However, g can be di⁄erent from the right hand side outside this region



















Ji (Ki) = Pi and Ji (K￿i) = 0 for i = A;B (15)
will satisfy jJi (z)j ￿ P;jJ0
i (z)j ￿ M;i = A;B 8z 2 [KB;KA]
Therefore, any solution to the boundary value problem (15) is also a solution to the original
problem (8).
In order to prove the existence and the uniqueness of the solution to the boundary problem
(8); we ￿rst provide a bound on the e⁄ort intensity of each ￿rm.
Lemma 4 There exists some M depending only on PA;PB;KA;KB and c(:) such that 0 <
J0
A (z);￿J0
B (z) < M 8z 2 (KB;KA)
Proof. Let D(z) = JA (z)￿JB (z) then D0 (z) = J0
A (z)￿J0
B (z) and 0 < J0
A (z);￿J0
B (z) <






























































where P = max(PA;PB):This is due to the facts that
0 ￿ ￿cA ((fA (J
0
























0 ￿ ￿cB ((fB (￿J
0













































By the mean value theorem, there exists a z￿ 2 (KB;KA) such that D0 (z￿) =
PA+PB
KA￿KB.
8z 2 [KB;KA]. It then follows that
PA + PB
>





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
>






















￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
D0(t)=s
=





















￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
:
The last equality is a result of a change of integration variables from t to s = D0 (t):









































= PA + PB:
We conclude that
D
0 (z) < M 8z 2 (KB;KA):
Using these bounds on J0
A (z) and J0
B (z); we now can prove the existence of a solution
for any value of ri;Pi;Ki:7To this end, the following classical lemma from (G.Scorza-Dragoni
1935) will be useful:
7This proof follows closely Hartman (1960)
14Lemma Let g (t;x;x0) be a continuous and bounded (vector-valued) function for 0 ￿ t ￿
T and arbitrary (x;x0). Then, for arbitrary x0 and xT the system of di⁄erential equations
x
00 = g (t;x;x
0)
has at least one solution x = x(t) satisfying
x(0) = x0;x(T) = xT:
It is been pointed out by Bass (1958) that this lemma is easily derived from the Schauder￿ s
￿xed point theorem. In order to use this lemma, we need to transform the system (8) into













Proof of the Theorem 1. First, we can easily ￿nd two bounded, strictly increasing and
in￿nitely di⁄erentiable functions ’;￿ such that
’(x) = x if jxj ￿ P and j’
0j ￿ 1
































Since ’;￿ are bounded g is bounded, then by the Lemma from (G.Scorza-Dragoni 1935),











































KB ￿ z ￿ KA. We can proceed exactly the same way as in








KB ￿ z ￿ KA is also the solution to the original system.
In order to prove uniqueness, we use theorem XII-4.38 from (Hartman 1964, pg. 425).
8Theorem XII-4.3 (Hartman 1964, pg 425 )Let f (t;x;x0) be continuous for 0 ￿ t ￿ p and for (x;x0)
on some 2d-dimensional convex set. Let f (t;x;x0) have continuous partial derivatives with respect to the
components of x and x0. Let the Jacobian matrices of f with respect to x,x0
B (t;x;x0) = @xf (t;x;x0)
F (t;x;x0) = @x0f (t;x;x0)
15Proof of Theorem 2. In order to apply the Theorem XII - 4.3 (Hartman 1964, pg. 425),




































































Given that 0 < J0
A;￿J0






















Together with (Bs):s ￿
2minfrA;rBg
￿2 ksk
2, we have (10) implies (16).
Proof of Lemma 2. First we show that, whenever xA (z) = xB (z) = x, we have
x
0






























￿(xA (z) ￿ xB (z))J0






















for all constant vectors z 6= 0. Then the boundary value problem
x00 = f (t;x;x0)
x(0) = x0
x(p) = xp



























So (17) at z = z￿ implies that x0
A (z￿) > xB (z￿). As a result, there exists an ￿ > 0 such that
xA (z) > xB (z) over (z￿;z￿ + ￿). We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that there
exists an z > z￿ + ￿ such that xA (z) ￿ xB (z). Let z￿￿ be the in￿mum of these z￿ s, we have
xA (z
￿￿) = xB (z
￿￿):
However, (17) at z = z￿￿ implies that x0
A (z￿￿) > xB (z￿￿), so there exists an ￿0 > 0 such that
xA (z) < xB (z) over (z￿￿ ￿ ￿0;z￿￿). This contradicts the fact that z￿￿ is the in￿mum. So
xA (z) > xB (z) for all z > z￿. Similarly we have xA (z) < xB (z) for all z < z￿:
Proof of Proposition 1. 1) We rewrite equation (4) for B:













B (z) = rBJB (z) + cB (xB (z)) + (xA (z) ￿ xB (z))(￿J
0
B (z)) > 0:
Given that xA (z) > xB (z) and J0
B (z) < 0, together with JB (z) > 0 and cB (xB (z)) > 0
from Lemma 1, we have J00
B (z) > 0. As a result, J0
B (z) is strictly increasing over (z￿;KA] or
xB (z) = (c0
B)￿1(￿J0
B (z)) is strictly decreasing over the same interval.
2) We rewrite equation (4) for A:







A (z) = 0
Di⁄erentiate with respect to z
￿rAJ
0
A (z) + f￿c
0




A (z) ￿ xB (z)J
00









A (z) = 0
given that ￿c0
A (xA (z)) + J0





A (z) = ￿rAJ
0
A (z) + xB (z)J
00





Part 2) implies that x0
B (z) < 0 so if J00
A (z) ￿ 0 and rA = 0, then J000




0) ￿ 0 8z
0 ￿ z;
that is J0
A (z) is decreasing over (z;KA]. Notice that when rA > 0, rAJ0
A (z) > 0; the
statement above does not always hold: Discounting reduces the discouragement e⁄ect on
the leader.
17Proof of Lemma 3. Given that the upper bound x is not binding in equilibrium, (5)
implies a linear relationship between e⁄orts and slopes of the payo⁄ functions:
xA (z) = ￿AJ
0
A (z) and xB (z) = ￿￿BJ
0
B (z): (18)












Let e Ji (z) =
￿i













￿2 = e PA
and the di⁄erential equations on Ji (z), i 2 fA;Bg become






+ 2 e J
0
i (z) e J
0
￿i (z) + e J
00
i (z) = 0
8z 2 (KB;KA) (19)
We can see immediately that this system of equations and the boundary conditions are
equivalent to the ones resulting from the game with




Closed form Derivation. Substituting the functional forms of the cost functions into
(5), we have
xA (z) = J
0
A (z) and xB (z) = ￿J
0
B (z): (20)
Denote x = xA and y = xB. Di⁄erentiating both sides of (20) gives J00
A (z) = x0 (z) and
J00
B (z) = ￿y0 (z). Thus, we can rewrite (19) as a system of ￿rst-order di⁄erential equations
















0 = 0: (21)
We derive the boundary conditions for (21) using Lebnitz￿ s rule:



















y (z)dz = PB: (22)





g is well-de￿ned since y > 0. We will ￿nd an explicit relationship between g and y. From
the de￿nition of g we have:
x
0 (z) = g
0 (y)y




0 (y)y = g (y)
1 + g (y)
1 ￿ 2g (y)
:
Rewrite this in a di⁄erential form:
dg (1 ￿ 2g)





d(lng ￿ 3ln(g + 1)) = d(lny):
This di⁄erential equation implies
C1g (y)
(g (y) + 1)
3 = y; (24)
where C1 > 0 is a constant pinned down by the boundary conditions. So, combining (23) and
(24) yields the strategy functions (12) in the text. Now with these expressions, we determine
g as a function of z. Di⁄erentiate the expression for x from (12) with respect to z implies
x
0 = g
0C1 (2(g + 1) ￿ 3g)g
(g + 1)
4 :













+ 2ln(g (z)) + g (z)
￿
= C1dz:




+ 2lng (z) = C1z + C2: (26)
19Again, the constant C2 is pinned down by the boundary conditions. We come back to write








(g (z) + 1)
3dz


















1 + g (KA)
























1 + g (KA)
1 + g (KB)
￿
= PB
These equations give a system of equations on g (KA) and g (KB)
1 + g (KA)




= exp(PA + PB):
We can then solve for g (KA) and g (KB) explicitly in functions of KA;KB;PA;PB
g (KA) =






exp(PA + PB) ￿ exp(PA)
: (28)
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